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CoRPoRATIONS - EFFECT oF A PROVISION IN ARTICLES OF lNcoRPORATION 
P.ERMITI'ING THE CoUNTING OF IN.r:sn:ssTED DIRECTORS FOR QuoRUM PURPOSES 
-Plaintiffs, minority stockholders, sought to restrain the consummation of a 
merger agreement between defendant Mayflower and Hilton corporations be-
cause the plan had not been approved by a quorum of disinterested directors of 
Mayflower.1 Defendants relied upon a provision in Mayflower's articles of 
incorporation which stated that " . . . any director may be counted in deter-
mining the existence of a quorum at any meeting of the Board of Directors 
of this Corporation for the purpose of authorizing any contract or transaction 
[between this Corporation and any other corporation in which any director 
or officer of this Corporation is pecuniarily or otherwise interested or is a 
director, member or officer of such corporation] with like force and effect as if 
he were not so interested, or were not a director, member or officer of such 
corporation. . . .'12 In reply, plaintiffs contended that because this provision 
was contrary to the Delaware common law rule precluding the counting of 
interested directors for quorum purposes it was in violation of the corporation 
statute which permitted only provisions consistent with the law of the state 
to be included in articles of incorporation.3 On appeal, held, such a provision 
does not violate the Delaware statute, at least in situations where the action 
1 Generally a director is deemed to be "interested" in a transaction when, as a result 
of the action taken by the board of directors, he may receive a financial benefit or be 
subjected to a financial loss, directly or indirectly. See SPELLMAN, CoRPoRATB DIRECTORS 
465 (1931), and 2 FLETCHER, Cyc. CORP., perm. ed., 213 (1931). In the principal case, 
Hilton owned 83% of Mayflower's stock. The court does not set out with clarity the 
interest which the Mayflower directors had, except to note they were all "nominees of 
Hilton." If they were not financially interested in Hilton, it may be doubted whether the 
mere fact that Hilton elected them would make them "interested" directors. It is not clear 
that even holding stock in Hilton would disqualify them. See 2 FLETCHER, Cyc, CoRP., 
perm. ed., 213 (1931). 
2Principal case at 117, n. 3. 
a Delaware General Corporation Law §5(8), Del. Rev. Code (1935) §2037(8). This 
provision is now found in Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 8, §1020?)(1). 
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taken by the board of directors must be submitted for stockholders' approval.4 
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., (Del. 1952) 93 A. (2d) 107. 
In the absence of a contrary provision in the pertinent corporation statute, 
articles of incorporation or by-laws, a majority of the board of directors of a 
corporation constitutes a quorum.5 When a quorum is present, a majority of 
the directors attending the meeting has power to decide any question coming 
before that meeting.6 Nevertheless, a director who has a personal interest7 
in a contract or transaction with his corporation is generally not qualified to 
act for the corporation concerning such contract or transaction.8 Thus, in the· 
absence of a contrary provision in the corporation statute or articles of incor-
poration, it is held that a director cannot vote on a resolution affecting the subject 
of his interest, at least if his vote is necessary to carry or defeat the resolution.9 
This in turn has led the overwhelming majority of our courts to declare that 
an interested director cannot be counted for quorum purposes if the board is 
about to consider a question involving his interest.10 Where an interested 
director attempts to act for the corporation, the approach is different from that 
taken where the court is considering the result of relations between a director, 
acting solely for himself, and his corporation. In the former situation, the 
director is usually held to be completely disqualified to act, without regard to 
his good faith or the fairness of his actions, while in the latter the fairness of 
the contract or transaction is of prime importance.11 Although there is general 
agreement as to these basic rules, there is a remarkable lack of authority on the 
validity of a provision in corporate articles purporting to authorize the counting 
4 There was no provision in the Delaware statute relative to the right of an interested 
director to- be counted for quorum purposes or to vote. Compare the Michigan General 
Corporation Act, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §450.13, 1[5, which may inferentially authorize 
certain interested directors to vote or be counted toward a quorum. It should be noted that 
the merger plan in the principal case was later approved by a majority of the Mayflower 
stockholders, which may have removed the necessity for prior action by the board of 
directors. The court assumed it did not in deciding the question presented. 
5 2 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., 204 (1931); S.Pl!LLMAN, CORPORATE DIREc-
TORs 338 (1931), 
6 2 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., 210 (1931). 
7 See note 2 supra. 
8 See the cases cited in notes 9 and IO infra. 
9 Many cases are collected in SPELLMAN, CoRPoRATE DIRECTORS 471 (1931); 175 
A.L.R. 577 at 596 et seq. (1948). 
10 The Delaware decision relied upon by plaintiffs in the principal case is Blish v. 
Thompson Auto. Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A. (2d) 581 (1948). Many cases in 
support of the majority rule are collected in SPELLMAN, CoRPORATE DIRECTORS 472 
(1931); 2 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., 211 (1931); and 175 A.L.R. 577 (1948). 
The few cases allowing the interested director to be counted for quorum purposes include 
Leavitt v. Oxford & G.M.S. Co., 3 Utah 265, l P. 356 (1883); Buell v. Buckingham & 
Co., 16 Iowa 284 (1864); Gumaer v. Cripple Creek Tunnel, etc., Co., 40 Colo. 1, 90 · 
P. 81 (1907). The Colorado decision seems to have been overlooked by later Colorado 
cases, however. See cases cited in 175 AJ...R. 577 at 596 (1948). Some courts even hold 
that an interested director cannot be present during the discussion and vote on a matter 
involving his interest. See 175 A.L.R. 577 at 596 et seq. (1948). 
11 See excellent discussion in SPJ!LLMAN, CORPORATE DIREcroRs 465 (1931). 
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of an interested director for quorum purposes. Specifically, the question is 
whether the stockholders may contract in opposition to the common law rule.12 
A provision similar to that in Mayflower's articles has been upheld by one 
other court.13 There is also some authority which, while not squarely deciding 
this question, indicates that a similar result would be reached if the issue were 
raised. For example, there are some decisions, resting in part upon provisions 
authorizing interested directors to vote, which have approved action taken at 
meetings where there was an obvious lack of a disinterested quorum, although 
the quorum question was not specifically considered.14 Jurisdictions which as 
a general rule do not permit interested directors to be counted for quorum 
purposes have sustained action taken in the absence of a disinterested quorum 
in particular instances.15 Although broad language is used, these results usually 
rest upon some strong policy consideration such as the fact that an opposite 
decision would unduly delay corporate action without any countervailing ad-
vantage to the objecting stockholder. A by-law has been upheld which provided 
that directors originally counted as part of a quorum might withdraw when 
matters in which they had an interest were to be considered, and that the 
meeting, although thereafter made up of less than the number originally required 
for a quorum, might proceed with its business.16 There are some considerations 
which indicate the soundness of these results. First, the common law rule 
appears to have been developed for the protection of stockholders. However, 
where the stockholders are notified in advance of the removal of the interested 
director's disabilities, it would seem they should have little complaint when the . 
director acts for the corporation. They should be estopped from attacking bona 
fide action of the board merely because some or all of the directors counted for 
quorum purposes were interested in the result of the action.17 Second, approval 
of the action taken would seem quite justified in a situation like the one pre-
sented in the principal case. Otherwise corporate action on an advantageous 
transaction might be forestalled merely because a majority of the board is 
interested in the subject of the transaction.18 Finally, where the action taken 
12 The validity of these provisions, which are more common than the number of 
decisions would indicate, is seldom questioned unless most or all of the directors acting on a 
particular matter were interested, and even then the attack usually forms part of a fight by 
one group of stockholders to block action desired by another. 
13 Piccard v. Sperry Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1943) 48 F. Supp. 465. Even this case is not 
a clear decision because it rested in part upon lack of applicable state authority. Faint 
authority will also be found in Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179 
P. (2d) 147 (1946), and Francis v. Brigham Hopkins Co., 108 Md. 233, 70 A. 95 (1908). 
14 Spiegal v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E. (2d) 895 (1937); 
Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E. (2d) 18 (1942). As to the effect of such a 
clause when the result of a transaction is under scrutiny, compare Whalen v. Hudson 
Hotel Co., 183 App. Div. 316, 170 N.Y.S. 855 (1918). . 
15 Kirn v. Kraus Plumbing Co., 12 Ohio App. 55 at 60-62 (1919); Meyer v. Fort 
Hill Engraving Co., 249 Mass. 302, 143 N.E. 915 (1924). 
16 El Cajon Portland Cement Co. v. Wentz Engineering Co., (6th Cir. 1908) 165 
F. 619. 
17 See SPELLMAN, Coru>oRATE Dnmcn:ons 474 (1931). 
18 The problem of forestalling corporate action is particularly acute when a fight 
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by the board is specifically subject to stockholder approval, as it was in the 
principal case, there would seem to be little reason for not giving effect to a 
clause allowing interested directors to be counted for quorum purposes or even 
to vote on questions touching the subject of their interest.19 
James W. Callison, S.Ed. 
develops in a closed corporation where the members of the board are the sole stockholders. 
It is no doubt possible for an interested board of directors to resign or be removed and a 
disinterested board elected in its place, but such would entail difficulties for the corporation, 
especially if time was of the essence. Further, the result more often than not would be 
the election of a mere dummy board, which from a technical standpoint might answer 
the interested quorum problem but which would be of little actual aid to objecting minority 
stockholders. · 
19 If action by an interested board or quorum is sanctioned, the result of the transac-
tion is still open to scrutiny, and it is only right that the burden of proving the fairness be 
placed upon the defendants. See principal case at 109-110. 
